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1. INTRODUCTION
The scope and determinants of corruption have been poorly studied in Bolivia. Although
public theft, patronage,  clientelism and nepotism have been routinely denounced in
government policy statements and cited in international donor reports, little hard evidence
has pointed to the costs or effects of corrupt public practice. The recent wave of state
reforms that has swept through the region suggests the importance of “getting institutions
right”, by changing the way in which the public policy is designed, implemented and
monitored (Burki and Perry 1998; Graham and Naim 1998; Picciotto and Wiesner 1998). In
the Bolivian case, reformers have placed decentralization and citizen participation at the
heart of the policy reform agenda (Burki et al. 1998; Peterson 1997; Campbell 1997). Over
the past five years, the framework for social service delivery has witnessed a radical overhaul
designed to increase citizen voice and heighten public accountability. Despite these
ambitious efforts, public sector performance is still perceived as being widely heterogeneous
and subject to particularistic interests (Gray-Molina and Molina 1997, Gray-Molina 1997).
How can the spotty record of “success” and “failure” observed in the field be accounted
for?
In this study we analyze the institutional factors that affect public accountability and
corruption by focusing on the incentive structure faced by providers and users of health
services in Bolivia. The Bolivian Popular Participation and Administrative Decentralization
reforms, implemented since 1994, provide a unique scenario by which to study the
comparative effects of institutional incentives over policy performance. We analyze the
effectiveness of hierarchical controls and voice/exit factors in deterring public corruption at
the municipal level. Three questions are analyzed through a survey of thirty municipal
hospitals.
First, we analyze perceptions on corrupt practice within municipal hospitals. We find
that the public health sector is perceived as being one of the least corrupt from an array of
public and private institutions. Respondents suggest that, within the public sector, the most
frequent forms of corruption  are related to bureaucratic red-tape and public works
corruption. Within the health sector, doctors and nurses point to theft of medical supplies,
patient misdirection to the private sector and payments over operation scheduling as being4
the most frequent practices. Finally, most respondents believe that corruption in the health
sector has decreased over the past five years.
Second, we analyze the determinants of informal payments to municipal health
service providers (medical, nursing and administrative staff). We find that approximately
40% of clients have made informal payments to service providers at the municipal level.
Voice and exit variables (health board activism and private health provider) are significant
deterrents to informal payments. Hierarchical controls (personnel hiring and supervision
systems) are less significant in our analysis, but point in the right direction.
Third, we describe the variations of input prices for four homogenous inputs
(dextrose 5%, physiological solution, sterilized cotton and alcohol) and analyze the
determinants of prices for a single input. We find that, although official input prices are set
at the Ministry of Health, actual price variations are significant. Key determinants of price
variation are voice (proxied by health board activism) and administrator characteristics
(education, job tenure). Hierarchical control variables are barely significant in deterring input
overpricing.
Fourth, we contrast hard and soft measures of corruption for our sample of
municipal hospitals.  We find that perceptions of corruption generally mirror high actual
incidences of informal payments and input overpricing. The strongest correlation is
observed in capital cities and large municipalities.
In the following pages we survey the Bolivian case of health service delivery, and
present a conceptual framework for analyzing corruption.  We then describe the data and
present findings on the determinants of informal payments, input overpricing and hard/soft
data comparisons.  The final section summarizes findings and discusses implications for the
analysis of transparency and corruption in the region.
2.  THE BOLIVIAN CONTEXT
2.1  The Health Sector
The health sector in Bolivia accounts for a significant size of social service expenditures,
equivalent to $US 284 million in 1998, or $US 44 per capita and 4.7% of GDP (Cárdenas
and Darrás 1997).  Health services are financed primarily by user fees (35%), followed by5
private sector funds (34%) international cooperation (14%), and direct government subsidies
(13%).  The destination of financing is mixed, with 38% directed to private sector delivery
services 33% to social security services, and 29% to public sector delivery services. This
contrasts with the coverage of services, which according to the most recent census, was
predominantly public (44%, 30% of which was met by public sector providers and 14% by
the social security system).  Private coverage of services accounted for 30% of total






   Births 42 62 21
   Prenatal Controls 53 68 36
   Family Planning 18 25 7
   Immunization 37 44 28
Mortality Rates
   Infant (x 1,000) 75 69 106
  Child (x 1,000) 116 104 162
  Maternal (x 100,000) 390 274 524
Disease Incidence
  Pneumonia (IRAs) 19 19 17
  Diarrhea (EDAs) 20 11 29
Sources: Encuesta Nacional de Demografia y Salud 1994, Censo Nacional de Poblacion y
Vivienda 1992.
Public sector health coverage is low by regional standards, and concentrated mainly in urban
areas. Mortality rates, particularly child and maternal rates, are among the highest in Latin
America despite important advances in recent years. Urban/rural differentials continue to
pose a significant challenge to increased public sector coverage for immunization, family
planning and pre- and post-natal attention. Pneumonia, diarrhea and other infectious and
respiratory diseases account for the most significant proportions of infant and child
mortality in the country (see table 2.1).6
2.2  Decentralization and Popular Participation
The delivery of health services in Bolivia has undergone significant changes since the
implementation of the Popular Participation and Administrative Decentralization reforms.
The following points summarize the institutional framework in which health services are
provided:
a) Central government: The Ministry of Health is the line agency charged with national
policymaking in the health sector.  The Ministry is in charge of designing and overseeing the
implementation of medium and long-term national health strategies.  It also manages an
array of national programs (for the prevention of cholera, malaria, tuberculosis, and other
epidemiological groups) funded through international cooperation and implemented by
decentralized  prefectural offices or private voluntary organizations.  Intergovernmental
transfers for public health investments are administered by the Social Investment Fund,
under the Ministry of the Presidency.  In recent years, the Ministry has focused almost
exclusively on policy formulation (sectoral decrees and regulations) and has shifted policy
implementation responsibilities to the  prefectural and municipal levels.  The central
government today handles approximately 90% of total health recurrent expenditures (made
up mostly by salaries), but only 30% of public investments.
b) Prefectures: The central government delegates administrative responsibilities and
resources to nine prefectures.  These departmental-level administrations are charged with
payroll administration and management of national programs designed and funded at the
central level.  They play an essentially passive role in policy-making and act as a hinge
between the municipal and the central government levels.
c)  Municipal Governments: Municipal governments hold administrative and fiscal
responsibilities over infrastructure maintenance and equipment of first and second level
health centers. Level I centers include community health and sanitary posts, while Level II
centers refer to basic service hospitals, which oversee general medicine, surgery, pediatrics
and gynecology/obstetrics. Municipalities today account for approximately 70% of new
public investments in health infrastructure and equipment, as well as 10% of recurrent
expenditures (mostly maintenance services).
d) Sub-Municipal: Besides the formal distribution of responsibilities and resources
between the central, prefectural and municipal levels, the Popular Participation law provides7
for the establishment of Local Health Directories (DILOS) in each municipality.  The
DILOS is a participatory planning and monitoring board that oversees first- and second-
level health centers. It is made up of three key actors: community-level user groups,
municipal-level officials and prefectural-level health officials.  While DILOS have been slow
in forming, they have been reported as being more effective than all-purpose oversight
committees established for citizen voice and oversight (Ruiz and  Giussani 1997, Gray-
Molina and O’Neill 1998).
The introduction of intergovernmental grants for locally-based programs has marked
an important shift in the pattern of health service financing. The most important of these is
the Seguro Materno Infantil, which provides free care for mothers and infants in post and pre-
partum attention and child care (pneumonia and diarrhea).  The Seguro is financed by a 3%
earmarked municipal contribution coupled by central government grants for personnel,
supplies and medication. Since its introduction, in 1996, it has been one of the most
successful programs in expanding health care coverage, particularly in rural areas. A recent
study documents a 70% increase in the total number of prenatal controls, a 31% increase in
institutionalized child birth, a 266% increase in pneumonia treatment and an 85% increase in
diarrhea treatment (Dmytraczenko 1998). The greatest increases in coverage have occurred
at Level I (health posts) and Level II (basic service hospitals) health centers, administered at
the municipal level (see table 2.2)8
Table 2.2
Coverage figures for the Seguro Materno Infantil (1995-1997)
1995 1996 1997 % 95-97
Total Child Births 27,622 28,087 36,362 31.6
  Level III General Hospitals
  Level II Basic Hospitals













Prenatal Controls 61,149 73,390 104,310 70.6
  Level III General Hospitals
  Level II Basic Hospitals













Pneumonia (children < 6) 1,682 2,446 6,165 266.5
  Level III General Hospitals
  Level II Basic Hospitals













Diarrhea (children < 6) 13,885 17,657 25,811 85.9
  Level III General Hospitals
  Level II Basic Hospitals













Source: Dmytrazcenko et al. (1998)
3.  ANALYZING CORRUPTION
In a majority of cases…corruption ordinarily refers to the use of public office for
private gain, where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the
public (the principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment.,
which is difficult to monitor for the principal. (Bardhan 1997: 1321).
Building on Bardhan’s definition, we focus on three sub-types of corruption: informal user
payments, overpricing of homogeneous medical inputs, and public perceptions on
absenteeism, medical supplies theft and the private use of public facilities. We sketch out a
basic analytical model to help approximate the incentive structure faced by heath providers
and users. Incentives are loosely defined by their agency and voice/exit characteristics.9
3.1 Agency Problems
In the basic principal-agent problem, the key obstacle to coordinated action is related to the
observation that principals and agents often have dissimilar objectives as well as different
sources and types of information.  While both problems induce shirking on the part of the
agent, the first is typically addressed by pursuing monitoring and sanctioning strategies that
maximize the principal’s objectives, and the second, by shaping incentives that are in line
with the agent’s own interests (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1984).  As noted by Banerjee (1997)
and Bossert (1997), the basic agency problem is made more complex in the context of
decentralized decision-making, particularly in developing countries. Decentralization policies
typically expand the range of  “formal” and “informal” choice in ways that are not strictly
accounted for by the basic principal agent model.  Bossert uses the concept of “decision
space” to capture this difference.
“Decision space” [is defined] as the range of effective choice that is allowed by the
central authorities (the principal) to be utilized by local authorities (the agents).  This
space can be formally defined by laws and regulations. [It] defines the specific “rules
of the game” for decentralized agents.  The actual (or “informal”) decision space
may also be defined by lack of enforcement of these formal definitions that allows
lower level officials to “bend the rules”. (Bossert 1997: 12).
This modified principal-agent approach allows for a mapping of agency problems at
different levels of decision-making (prefectural, municipal, service provider) and for different
functions within each level (finance, service organization,  human resources).  While the
municipal range of effective decision space for personnel hiring or firing may be limited, for
example, the decision space for the procurement of equipment may be wide.  Likewise, with
hierarchical relations, where the effective range of public oversight might be weak at the
municipal level, but strong at the clinic or health post level.  While in some instances
decision space is likely to promote opportunities for beneficial policy innovations in local
practice, in others it may actually widen the scope of corrupt, unaccountable or discretionary
decision-making.  The nature of this trade-off will be made more apparent in section III,
when we address a particular instance of local decision-making.10
3.2 Voice and Exit Problems
Hierarchical systems of administrative control over public service providers are often made
more effective by user monitoring at the local level. Some analysts have modeled this
accountability-building mechanism as a “voice” and “exit” problem (Hirschman 1970; Paul
1994; Picciotto 1997). Public service users assess their approval or disapproval of services
through voice (protest) or exit (finding alternative sources of supply).  Under this model,
public accountability is maximized when users exercise a voice option in their assessment of
services. Voice is most effective when exit is unavailable and there are no informational, legal
or institutional barriers hindering voice.  In practice, however, many of these restrictive
conditions prevail in developing countries, particularly for the rural poor.  How can user
groups overcome these obstacles to effective public service monitoring?
Paul (1992) considers four strategies for gaining leverage over voice, in the context
of dispersed and monopolistic public service provision for the poor: first, establishing
independent monitoring groups (such as comptrollers or ombudsmen) with direct access to
official sources of information and records; second, establishing participatory boards at the
local government level that allow user groups to scale up the scope of their collective action;
third, promoting linkages with  NGOs and Churches that promote external oversight
mechanisms, and fourth, introducing public hearings/referenda to allow grievances to made
in the public forum. Bottom-up voice strategies are expected to promote public
accountability by exposing agency problems related to hidden action. The “voice
accountability performance response” model, however, is premised on the expectation that
bottom-up mechanisms actually lead to top-down policy responses, which again calls into
play the agency problems discussed above. Whether voice is effective or not is ultimately an
empirical question, to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
3.3  An Analytical Model
We propose a simplified analytical model to account for the agency problems that
characterize public service delivery. While “corruption” cannot be directly observed, we can
observe variations from expected service prices. We approximate these variations by
accounting, first, for individual and municipal-level characteristics, second, for effective11
administrative discretion at the municipal level (discretion in personnel hiring and
management), and third, for the degree of voice exercised by service users (proxied by the
degree of citizen health board activism). The choice of engaging in corrupt public practice
can be modeled in terms of the incentive structure facing potential corrupters. If a public
official can be assumed to maximize his or her expected income:
E(Y)= (1-p)(Bc + W)+p(Cc)
Where E(Y) is expected income, Bc is the expected benefit accruing from corruption, W is
wages,  Cc is the expected penalty from being caught and p is the probability of being
detected. The probability of detection can itself be modeled in terms of the institutional
incentives faced the corrupter.
p = p(Voice, Discretion)
In this model voice and administrative discretion are observed characteristics of the
municipal decision-making environment. Voice deters corruption by raising the probability
of detection and therefore decreasing the expected income from engaging in corruption.
Hierarchical controls deter corruption through two channels, both subject to agency
problems. The first is backward looking, restraining the discretion with which agents
operate; the second is forward looking, signaling the sanctioning credibility of hierarchical
controls if acts of corruption are detected.
We hypothesize that voice is likely to be effective for practices directly involving
service users (such as bribes), while hierarchical controls are likely to be important for
practices relating to hidden action (such as petty theft). We also expect voice and discretion
factors to interact along a range of outcomes. In theory, four possible scenarios are relevant
to our analysis (see table 2.1). While extreme scenarios (high voice/narrow discretion and
low voice/wide discretion) suggest fairly predictable outcomes, the mixed scenarios are likely
to be of most interest, because they suggest the differential weight of market/hierarchical
interactions.12
Table 3.1






















Depends on agency incentives.
“Activist” service provider
“Activist” service user
4.  A STUDY OF MUNICIPAL HOSPITALS
4.1  Data
We use data from a municipal hospital survey conducted in November 1998.  Thirty
hospitals from 24 municipalities were surveyed on informal payments, input pricing and
perceptions on absenteeism, supply and equipment theft, and inappropriate use of public
facilities.
1 The sample was selected in two steps: First, municipalities were ranked according
to an index of administrative discretion, as reported by the 1997 Census of Municipal
Governments. “Highly” discretionary systems were defined by the absence of  (1) a
competitive hiring system, (2) an investment planning system and (3) an internal auditing
system. “Low” discretionary municipalities were defined by the presence of one or more of
these. Second, twelve “highly” discretionary municipalities and twelve “low” discretionary
municipalities were selected for canvassing, from three clusters of municipalities located
around the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. The final sample included thirty
municipal hospitals. Twenty-eight of the hospitals surveyed were Level II municipal
                                                       
1 The survey was carried out by Encuestas y Estudios, an affiliate of Gallup Polls in Bolivia.13
hospitals charged with four areas of health attention: general medicine, surgery, pediatrics
and gynecology.  Two hospitals were Level III, charged with more specialized services (see
table 4.1 for general characteristics of the sample).
Table 4.1













UNIVERSE 188 2,985 434 689 433
SAMPLE 30 853 220 405 173
  El Alto 1 52 18 14 12
  Achacachi 1 15 5 8 8
  Patacamaya 1 4 3 11 1
  Viacha 1 30 4 20 3
  Montero 1 56 9 20 8
  Punata 1 32 9 11 14
  Quillacollo 1 27 7 10 7
  Capinota 1 22 5 6 4
  Sipe Sipe 1 16 2 7 1
  Tiquipaya 1 12 1 2 0
  Copacabana 1 12 2 4 2
  Pucarani 1 9 3 10 4
  Sacaba 1 6 4 4 3
  Ayo Ayo 1 10 1 0 2
  Mineros 1 6 3 11 7
  Batallas 1 12 3 5 2
  San Carlos 1 47 5 11 7
  El Torno 1 14 1 6 1
  Yapacani 1 3 1 0 0
  Cotoca 1 18 4 5 3
  Buena Vista 1 12 3 7 2
  La Paz (a) 3 189 57 72 32
  Cochabamba (b) 3 96 32 81 24
  Santa Cruz 3 153 38 60 26
(a)  La Paz was sampled for two Level II (basic services) and one Level III (general services) hospital.
(b)  Cochabamba was sampled for two Level II (basic services) and one Level III (general services) hospital.
Sources: Censo Municipal, Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación y Ministerio
de Hacienda (1999); Secretaria Nacional de Salud – DOSSME (1997).
Although the sample covers only a sixth of the total number of Level II hospitals, it
accounts for nearly two-thirds of the nurses, half of the doctors and a third of the bed14
capacity of basic service hospitals in the country. We collect data from four different
sources: patients (301 obserations), nurses (60 observations), doctors (55 observations) and
hospital administrators (24, observations). We also use administrative and citizen
participation data from the 1998 Municipal Census to construct explanatory variables on
voice/exit and hierarchical controls.
4.2  Perceptions on Corruption
Three types of perceptions on corruption were collected. First, we asked patients, doctors
and nurses to assess health and non-health sector institutions on a continuum from least to
most corrupt. We assess differences for an array of public and private sector institutions,
including patients’ assessment of their own workplace. Second, we asked the same groups to
assess an array of corrupt practices, most of which deal with health services. Finally, we ask
doctors and nurses to assess the frequency of corrupt practices within their workplace. This
includes an evaluation of absenteeism, theft and misuse of public facilities for private gain.
We also ask for comparisons between past and present corruption in the health sector. First
we report on health and non-health sector comparisons for patients, nurses and doctors (see
table 4.2). A general pattern emerges for comparisons across groups: the police and customs
are perceived as being the most corrupt institutions, while the Church, public schools and
public hospitals are seen as the least corrupt. Patients score Church-related corruption a 1.83,
public school corruption a 2.62 and public hospital corruption a 2.63, on a five-point scale
between 1 (never corrupt) and 5 (always corrupt).
Once we move to comparisons within groups, patients see the police and customs as
being most corrupt and the Church and public hospitals as being least corrupt. Doctors, on
the other hand, see police, customs and the presidency as being more corrupt than patients
do. The Ministry of Health is scored a 2.64 by nurses, 2.84 by patients and a 3.48 by doctors.
The ministry is judged to be “always” corrupt by 18% of doctors, 16% of nurses and 6% of
patients. Most respondents rate the ministry as being “sometimes” corrupts (24% of
patients, 34% of doctors and 23% of nurses). A third and relevant perception relates to
municipal governments. Municipal governments were given a score of 4.17 by doctors, 3.89
by patients and 3.48 by nurses. Approximately 28% of patients, 40% of doctors and 46% of15
nurses see municipal government as being “always” corrupt, suggesting a relatively dismal
perception of local government in the wake of decentralization reforms.
Table 4.2

















  Presidency 1.66 4.65 10.3 33.89 24.58 24.92 100 4.00
  Customs 1 3.65 8.97 29.57 38.87 17.94 100 4.24
  Supreme Court 3.32 6.98 9.63 25.25 25.25 29.57 100 3.88
  Municipal Government 2.66 6.31 16.94 31.23 28.57 14.29 100 3.89
  Public Utilities 6.98 17.94 19.93 14.95 8.64 31.56 100 3.00
  Public Schools 14.62 19.6 32.89 10.96 3.32 18.6 100 2.62
  Police 1.66 2.99 10.96 24.25 47.84 12.29 100 4.29
  Catholic Church 38.64 15.28 11.96 5.65 1 27.57 100 1.83
  Ministry of Health 9.97 17.94 24.58 14.29 5.98 27.24 100 2.84
  Public Hospitals 15.28 25.58 19.93 11.63 7.31 20.27 100 2.63
DOCTORS
  Presidency 7.27 1.82 7.27 29.09 40 14.55 100 4.08
  Customs 0 0 1.82 32.73 58.18 7.27 100 4.60
  Supreme Court 1.82 3.64 21.82 34.55 30.91 7.27 100 3.96
  Municipal Government 0 5.45 12.73 38.18 40 3.64 100 4.17
  Public Utilities 5.45 14.55 25.45 18.18 18.18 18.18 100 3.35
  Public Schools 20 21.82 30.91 5.45 7.27 14.55 100 2.51
  Police 1.82 3.64 7.27 21.82 61.82 3.64 100 4.43
  Catholic Church 38.18 21.82 18.18 1.82 1.82 18.18 100 1.86
  Ministry of Health 3.64 9.09 34.55 21.82 18.18 12.73 100 3.48
  Public Hospitals 9.09 30.91 36.36 16.36 1.82 5.45 100 2.69
NURSES
  Presidency 0 0 13.33 30 33.33 23.33 100 4.26
  Customs 3.33 0 6.67 23.33 50 16.67 100 4.40
  Supreme Court 0 3.33 16.67 26.67 30 23.33 100 4.09
  Municipal Government 0 3.33 23.33 20 46.67 6.67 100 3.48
  Public Utilities 6.67 13.33 30 6.67 16.67 26.67 100 3.18
  Public Schools 20 20 23.33 10 3.33 23.33 100 2.43
  Police 6.67 0 6.67 20 50 16.67 100 4.28
  Catholic Church 53.33 16.67 3.33 3.33 0 23.33 100 1.43
  Ministry of Health 23.33 13.33 23.33 16.67 6.67 16.67 100 2.64
  Public Hospitals 16.67 23.33 33.33 13.33 13.33 0 100 2.83
(a)  Average Score: Weighted average, where 1= “never”, 2= “a little”, 3= “some”, 4= “a
lot”, 5= “always”. Excludes “no responses”.
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998)16
Respondents were also asked to rate the frequency of corrupt practices within the public
sector (see table 4.3). Bribes related to red-tape paperwork are seen as being most frequent
(average score of 4.25 for doctors, 4.24 for nurses and 3.91 for patients), followed by public
works corruption (4.01, 4.00 and 3.75) and municipal theft of supplies and equipment (3.77,
3.82 and 3.68). Doctors are generally more critical of public sector corruption than patients.
Forty-three % of doctors say red-tape bribes happen “always” compared to 33% of nurses
and 26% of patients. In addition, 36% of doctors say public works corruption occurs
“always”, compared to 30% of nurses and 20% of patients.  The least corrupt actions
reported by respondents relate to hospital bribes (score of 2.57 for doctors, 2.20 for nurses
and 2.71 for patients) and municipal absenteeism (3.26, 3.04 and 3.23). The highest rates of
“no response” are recorded by patients (32% on municipal absenteeism, 25% on public
works corruption) and nurses (27% on municipal theft).
Table 4.3

















Bribes-paperwork 1.33 5.55 18.27 33.55 26.25 14.95 100 3.91
Municipal public works 1.99 5.98 20.93 26.25 20.27 24.58 100 3.75
Municipal theft 2.33 8.31 21.59 24.25 20.93 22.59 100 3.68
Municipal absenteeism 4.65 11.96 23.92 17.94 9.63 31.89 100 3.23
Bribes-hospitals 16.28 20.27 20.93 17.28 5.98 19.27 100 2.71
DOCTORS
Bribes-paperwork 0 1.82 14.55 38.18 43.64 1.82 100 4.26
Municipal public works 1.82 5.45 18.18 30.91 36.36 7.27 100 4.02
Municipal theft 0 14.55 14.55 27.27 25.45 18.18 100 3.77
Municipal absenteeism 3.64 12.73 34.55 23.64 9.09 16.36 100 3.26
Bribes-hospitals 25.45 21.82 21.82 18.18 7.27 5.45 100 2.57
NURSES
Bribes-paperwork 0 6.67 0 43.33 33.33 16.67 100 4.24
Municipal public works 0 6.67 16.67 26.67 30 20 100 4.00
Municipal theft 0 6.67 16.67 33.33 16.67 26.67 100 3.82
Municipal absenteeism 6.67 33.33 10 23.33 13.33 13.33 100 3.04
Bribes-hospitals 5.40 16.67 3.33 20 3.33 16.67 100 2.20
(a)  Average Score: Weighted average, where 1= “never”, 2= “a little”, 3= “some”, 4= “a
lot”, 5= “always”. Excludes “no responses”.
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998)17
Doctors and nurses were also asked to assess the frequency of corrupt acts within their
workplace (see table 4.4). The most frequent practices identified by both groups were theft
of hospital supplies, patient direction to private practice and paying for operation scheduling.
Doctors gave operation scheduling a score of 4.26, followed by supply theft 4.17 and patient
misdirection 4.04. Forty-four percent of doctors believe payments for operations scheduling
“always” occurs, followed by supply theft (44%).  Doctors see medical supply procurement
as being least corrupt (score of 3.22).  Nurses, on the other hand, see supply theft as most
important (score of 4.44), followed by misdirection of patients to private practice (score of
4.16).  Nurses see medical supply procurement as being least corrupt (score of 2.88),
followed by cleaning service procurement (score of 3.52).  The highest rates of “no
response” were, for doctors, questions of supply theft (25%) and construction procurement
(24%), and for nurses, questions of supply procurement (43%) and operation turns (37%).
Table 4.4

















Procurement-cleaning 5 9 18 9 40 19 100 3.84
Procurement-construction 7 13 18 11 27 24 100 3.50
Procurement-catering 9 7 22 11 31 20 100 3.59
Procurement-supplies 9 16 22 13 20 20 100 3.22
Turns for operations 0 5 15 16 49 15 100 4.27
Patient misdirection 2 9 11 27 38 13 100 4.04
Theft of supplies 2 9 7 13 44 25 100 4.17
NURSES
Procurement-cleaning 16 7 7 3 37 30 100 3.52
Procurement-construction 7 10 7 23 23 30 100 3.66
Procurement-catering 7 7 17 7 33 30 100 3.76
Procurement-supplies 17 7 13 7 13 43 100 2.88
Turns for operations 7 7 3 7 40 37 100 4.05
Patient misdirection 7 0 13 13 47 20 100 4.17
Theft of supplies 3 7 7 17 50 17 100 4.44
(a)  Average Score: Weighted average, where 1= “never”, 2= “a little”, 3= “some”, 4= “a
lot”, 5= “always”. Excludes “no responses”.
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998)18
Finally, respondents were asked to assess how health sector corruption compares to non-
health sector corruption and whether it has increased over the past five years, following the
implementation of decentralization reforms (see table 4.5).  Patients respond that health
sector corruption is less frequent than elsewhere in society (50%).  They also assess it to be
less frequent than five years ago (41%).  When asked whether health sector corruption was
greater or smaller than corruption in their own workplace, most patients chose not to answer
(43%).  Doctors declare that health sector corruption is overwhelmingly less frequent than
non-health sector corruption (63%) and are evenly balanced on whether corruption has
increased or decreased over the past five years. Approximately 7% of doctors declare that
there is no corruption in the health sector. Nurses are more optimistic. Close to 73% say that
health sector corruption is less frequent than in other public sector institutions. Most nurses
declare that health sector corruption has decreased over the past five years (36%).
Table 4.5
How do you assess health sector corruption today?






Compared to other institutions 3.99 21.59 50.17 0 24.25 100
Compared to your workplace 5.88 17.65 32.94 0 43.53 100
Compared to five years ago 13.62 22.59 41.53 0 22.26 100
DOCTORS
Compared to other institutions 23.64 1.82 63.64 7.27 3.64 100
Compared to five years ago 36.36 20 34.55 5.45 3.64 100
NURSES
Compared to other institutions 0 6.67 73.33 13.33 6.67 100
Compared to five years ago 16.67 23.33 36.67 10 13.33 100
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998)
The perceptions reviewed in this section portray a comparatively benign picture of
corruption in the health sector. Most respondents suggest that the health sector is one of the
three least corrupt from a list of ten other public and private institutions. When asked to
assess the frequency of corrupt acts in the public sector, most respondents identify red-tape
and public works related corruption as being most frequent. Within the health sector itself,
doctors and nurses point to theft of medical supplies, patient misdirection to the private19
sector and payments over operation scheduling as being the most prominent. Finally, most
respondents believe that health-related corruption has decreased over the past five years.
Patients are particularly optimistic about recent improvements. In more general terms, 65%
of doctors, 71% of patients, and 80% of nurses believe the health sector is less or as corrupt
as other institutions in society.
4.3  Determinants of Informal Payments
The “informality” of informal payments is difficult to conceptualize, let alone measure.
While not all informal payments are unethical or illegal (some may supplement medical
treatment initiated elsewhere; others may be regarded as ex-post service gratuities), we
restrict our analysis to those informal payments which are illegal and explicitly proscribed by
existing legislation and regulations under the Bolivian Seguro Materno Infantil. We collect data
on informal payments relating to hospitalization, surgery, medication, materials and supplies,
laboratory work, x-rays and other treatments for services covered by the  Seguro. By
restricting our analysis to this subset, our dependent variable measures only illegal informal
payments, and hence does not capture other forms of bribery which may skirt the lines
between ethical norms and formal rules and regulations. We expect this measure to
underestimate the extent of informal payments between patients and service providers.
Approximately 40% of surveyed clients (112 of 281) reported making illegal payments under
one of the  Seguro’s three sub-programs. Considering approximately two thirds of our
respondents considered hospitals to be less or equally prone to corruption than other
institutions in society, this result would suggest a high degree of tolerance to petty bribery.
We address this question in section 4.5, when contrasting “hard” and “soft” measures of
corruption.
Does citizen voice matter for corruption prevention?  We hypothesize that voice
deters corruption by raising the probability that illegal payments are detected, thus increasing
the expected cost of engaging in corrupt practice. We also hypothesize  that hierarchical
controls that detect and sanction corruption act as deterrents to public wrong-doing.  In
principle, hierarchical controls can be analyzed at many levels of aggregation (hospital
controls, municipal controls, ministry auditing, comptroller auditing, administrative and civil20
justice courts, and so on). In this section we focus exclusively on municipal-level hierarchical
controls related to local hospital administration.
Table 4.6
















  Municipal poverty rate -1.23 0.017 -1.23 0.003 -6.68 0.000
  Client heard of Seguro Materno -0.17 0.523 -1.79 0.080 -0.37 0.537
  Client waiting hours 27.20 0.000 27.20 0.004 59.54 0.000
HIERARCHICAL CONTROLS
  Municipal competitive hiring -3.32 0.716 -3.32 0.789 -54.42 0.021
  Municipal personnel supervision -15.37 0.223 -15.37 0.164 -14.41 0.668
VOICE/EXIT
  DILOS participates (voice) -26.91 0.002 -26.91 0.004 -144.82 0.000
  Private hospital in town (exit) -0.01 0.000 -0.00 0.000 -73.27 0.063













(a)  Dependent variable: Informal payments (in $Bs.) made by patients under the Seguro Materno Infantil. In-
hospital payments for hospitalization, surgery, medication, materials and supplies, laboratory work, x-rays
or other services covered by the Seguro, were included under this measure. Voluntary payments and out-of
hospital payments were excluded.
(b)  Independent variables: MUNICIPAL POVERTY RATE is the basic needs index reported at the
municipal level; CLIENT WAITING HOURS is a dummy variable (1= more than 4 hours of waiting, 0=
less than four hours); CLIENT HEARD SEGURO is a dummy variable (1= yes, 0=no); MUNICIPAL
COMPETITIVE HIRING is a dummy variable measuring health personnel hiring discretion
(1=competitive, 0=non-competitive); MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL SUPERVISION is a dummy variable
measuring health personnel supervision (1=supervised, 0=unsupervised); DILOS PARTICIPATES is a
dummy variable measuring DILOS participation in the annual participatory planning process (1=activist,
0=non-activist); PRIVATE HOSPITAL is a dummy variable signaling alternative suppliers of health
services (1=exit option, 0=no exit option).
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998).
Three alternative specifications were run to test whether hierarchical or voice/exit factors
could account for illegal informal payments (see table 4.6).  The first specification is an OLS
regression, that measures the impact of hierarchical and  voice variables over payment21
amount, after controlling for individual and municipal level characteristics. In the second
OLS regression, we control for  heteroscedasticity (using robust standard errors) and
aggregation bias (clustering individual observations into municipal clusters) from the use of
multilevel data pooled in the same regression.  The third specification is a tobit regression
that controls for lower bound censoring of non-negative illegal payments. We believe the
tobit specification best tests the empirical relation between voice and bribery. A combination
of voice and hierarchical controls could potentially offer more- than-perfect-anti-corruption
protection, yet illegal payments will never drop to non-negative figures.
The OLS specifications suggest three main results. First, the level of municipal
poverty (POVERTY RATE) and client waiting hours (CLIENT WAITING HOURS), are
significantly correlated with informal payments. The higher the poverty rate, the lower the
payments; the higher the waiting hours the higher the payments. Second, after controlling
for individual and municipal characteristics, citizen health board activism (DILOS
PARTICIPATES), proxied by DILOS participation in municipal participatory planning, is
significantly correlated to lower payments, particularly when matched by an exit option in
the form of private health service provision (PRIVATE HOSPITAL).  Although both voice
and exit variables are statistically significant, only the voice variable shows a non-negligible
coefficient. After controlling for an array of individual and municipal controls the existence
of an active citizen health board deters informal payments by $B. 26. The third result is that
hierarchical control variables (COMPETITIVE HIRING SYSTEM and PERSONNEL
SUPERVISION SYSTEM) are negatively correlated to informal payments but less
significant than voice/exit variables.  Hierarchical controls appear to be less important than
the voice/exit variables in deterring corruption.
The tobit model ratifies the OLS regression results, but suggests the impact of voice
and exit variables is larger once we control for lower bound censoring. After controlling for
an array of individual and municipal characteristics, citizen board activism (DILOS) would
account for $Bs. 144 less of informal payments.  The existence of a private health service
provider (PRIVATE HOSPITAL) also diminishes the amount of average informal payments
by $Bs. 73. Under the  tobit model one hierarchical control variable (COMPETITIVE
HIRING SYSTEM) acts as a deterrent to corruption, while the other (PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM) remains statistically insignificant.22
All specifications suggest that voice and exit variables are significantly and negatively
related to informal payments once hierarchical and other control variables are taken into
account. As suggested by the recent literature on voice and exit, the voice option is most
likely to be significant where service users enter into direct contact with service providers, by
raising the probability of detection (Bossert 1997). The significance of the exit option would
also suggest the importance of competition in curtailing public sector corruption (see Ades
and Di Tella 1997, and Ades and Di Tella 1995). When public providers face competition
from private providers  and depend on user-cost recovery for recurrent financing, exit
effectively raises the price of non-compliance. How effective is the voice option? While
average informal payments are $Bs. 40 per service user, voice accounts for $Bs. 27 (or two-
thirds of their value) per user.  Our survey of patients under the Seguro Materno Infantil
would suggest the voice option is a powerful deterrent to illegal informal payments.
4.4  Determinants of Input Overpricing
The analysis of supply prices provides a more direct yardstick on the degree of corrupt or
particularistic behavior in the health sector. We collected prices for four relatively
homogeneous and widely available inputs: dextrose 5%, physiological solution, sterilized
cotton and alcohol.
2  Input prices are nominally set at the Ministry of Health, but show wide
variations in the field (see table 4.7).   While the official price of dextrose, for example, is set
at 5 Bs./liter, municipal receipts in 24 municipalities show variations between 2.04 and 8.75
(see table 3.5).  We hypothesize that part of this variation is due to overpricing at the
municipal level. In order to test this hypothesis, and analyze the determinants of price
variations, we ran alternative regressions on the ratio of actual input price receipts collected
at the hospital level to the officially regulated input prices. The ratio captures the average
variation from actual to official prices for dextrose.
                                                       
2 Prices were copied from official purchase receipts provided by municipal hospital administrators. Prices
were later standardized to comparable units of analysis.23
Table 4.7
Input Prices
N Min Max Mean Variance
Dextrose 5% 24 2.04 8.75 6.39 3.75
Physiological Solution 18 1.20 18.50 7.64 6.02
Cotton 16 0.8 28.6 15.64 65.24
Alcohol 13 1.30 8.00 5.39 3.11
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998).
Two OLS regressions measure the effects of administrator characteristics and the presence
or absence of hierarchical controls and citizen voice over input prices  (see table 4.8). The
variables that best explain variations in input prices relate to the personal characteristics of
the hospital administrator (TENURE and EDUCATION) and voice (DILOS). Job tenure is
negatively related to corruption. The longer the time on the job, the lower the ratio between
actual and official prices. In a context of politicized and discretionary administration, we
view job tenure as a proxy for job security and institutionalized hiring practices. The negative
correlation would support this view. The second variable, however, is more problematic.
Controlling for length of tenure, we find that education is positively correlated to input
overpricing. The positive sign would suggest that well-educated administrators are more
effective in covering up corrupt practice. While this makes intuitive sense, it also suggests
that, given the current incentive structure, policies designed to hire more qualified
administrators are more likely to promote rather than deter public sector corruption. Are
agency problems a driving factor behind this result? While we expected personnel
supervision and access to local distribution centers to be negatively and significantly
correlated to input overpricing, we find that hierarchical control variables are not significant
deterrents of corruption. Personnel supervision (PERSONNEL) is only weakly correlated to
overpricing and the presence of a local input distribution center (INPUT) is not significant
at all. The only other significant and negatively correlated variable is voice (DILOS). The
presence of an activist citizen health board is, in fact, the most important deterrent of input
overpricing. Citizen voice accounts for approximately 40% the variation between actual and
official prices. Other control variables are not significant in explaining input price variations.24
Table 4.8
Determinants of Input Prices
(1) P> |t| (2) P> |t|
CONTROL VARIABLES
  Administrator tenure -0.014 0.007 -0.015 0.010
  Administrator education  0.016 0.033  0.016 0.039
  Municipal poverty rate -0.006 0.242 -0.005 0.416
HIERARCHICAL CONTROL
  Personnel supervision system -0.345 0.202 -0.372 0.103
  Input distribution center  0.092 0.674
VOICE/EXIT
  DILOS participates -0.426 0.040 -0.404 0.064








(a)  Dependent variable: Ratio of input price receipts to official input prices (dextrose). Official input prices
provided by the Ministry of Health. Receipts standardized by purchase volume.
(b)  Independent variables: ADMINISTRATOR AGE describes the age of the hospital administrator;
ADMINISTRATOR EDUCATION, describes years of schooling; MUNICIPAL POVERTY RATE is
the basic needs index reported at the municipal level; PERSONNEL SUPERVISION is a dummy variable
measuring municipal personnel supervision of health staff (1=supervision, 0=no  supervison); INPUT
DISTRIBUTION is a dummy variable to signal whether an input distribution center exists in the
municipality (1=exists, 0=does not exist); DILOS PARTICIPATES is a dummy variable measuring health
board participation in annual participatory planning (1=participates, 0=does not participate);
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE PARTICIPATES is a dummy variable signaling participation in
participatory planning (1=participates, 0=does not participate).
Source: Municipal Hospital Survey (Encuestas y Estudios 1998).
What role do voice mechanisms play in deterring hidden action? Controlling for
administrator characteristics and hierarchical control variables, our estimates suggest voice
mechanisms are remarkably effective. Citizen activism accounts for approximately 40
percent of the variation between official and purchased prices. Given the low levels of
significance of hierarchical control variables, perhaps the more relevant question is what role
do administrative controls play in deterring and sanctioning corrupt practice? Our analysis
suggests a qualified answer. While hierarchical control variables are not significantly
correlated to corruption deterrence, we do find administrator job tenure to be significantly
and negatively correlated to overpricing. To the extent that tenure length is construed as a
proxy of institutional stability, factors that promote stable employment can be regarded as
additional deterrents to corrupt practice. The low R2 on both specifications also suggests25
that there is much that goes unexplained in our model, including political and administrative
deterrents of corruption working at beyond the local level (prefectural or line ministry
controls).
4.5  Hard and Soft Data Comparisons
Much of the literature on transparency and accountability has analyzed data derived from
public opinion surveys and polls. Few studies have collected empirical data on the scope and
determinants of corruption; fewer have compared both types of data for the same sample. In
this section we present a municipal comparison of “hard” and “soft” corruption indices. We
compare municipalities with high levels of corruption, as evidenced by informal payments
and input overpricing, to municipalities where corruption is perceived to be high, as
suggested by public opinion collected in user surveys.
Graph 4.1
Correlation between informal payments and perceptions on corruption
(a)  The y-axis describes the percentage of service users who described hospital corruption to be
greater or equal to corruption elsewhere in the public or private sector.











































The correlation between informal payments and perceptions on corruption is positive and
significant (0.551). In general terms, the perception that hospitals are more (or equally)
corrupt to other public or private sector institutions is positively correlated with a higher
incidence of informal payments. The strongest incidences of actual and perceived corruption
occur in the capital cities and relatively large municipalities; the weakest incidence in small
rural municipalities. How can this pattern be explained? One possibility is that perceptions
and acts of corruption are highly sensitive to the scale of health service delivery. Although
the hospitals in our sample are roughly of the same size, we find evidence to suggest that
larger hospitals do in fact show a higher incidence of both actual and perceived corruption.
A second possibility is that the market for informal payments, contrasted, for example with
the market for petty theft or input overpricing, is more sensitive to the “large hospital”
effect. This may account for substantial differences in informal payments in one-doctor
hospitals (in which they are largely absent), to multi-level hierarchical organizations (in which
they are more significant).  Agency problems, enhanced by size, might be made the main
culprit.27
Table 4.2
Correlation between input overpricing and perceptions on corruption
(a)  The y-axis describes the percentage of service users who described corruption to be greater or
equal to corruption elsewhere in the public or private sector.
(b)  The x-axis describes the ratio of actual to official input prices for dextrose.
We find a weaker, but also positive correlation between input overpricing and perceptions of
corruption (0.214). The perception that hospitals are more (or equally) corrupt than other
public or private sector institutions is positively correlated to the degree of price variations in
dextrose, and physiological solution. The distribution of actual and perceived corruption is
not as dependent on hospital size as with informal payments.  We find a scattering of
perceived and actual corruption observations for large and small hospitals alike. How to
account for this result? As discussed in the previous section, the hidden action nature of
input overpricing suggests that the existence of personnel management, public procurement
and auditing capabilities are more important than size as deterrents of overpricing. The most
relevant contrast, in this case, is between highly discretionary and often politicized municipal






































































































What can be learnt from hard/soft data comparisons? The positive  correlations
suggest that perceptions on corruption generally mirror the available evidence on public
sector corruption. It should be noted, however, that the correlation for services in which
users are directly involved is higher than when discretionary actions go unobserved. As
suggested earlier, the use of citizen voice is likely to be correlated with public perceptions of
wrong-doing. The greater the perception of corruption, the more likely citizens will make use
of voice mechanisms and monitor public service delivery. In more general terms, the
hard/soft data comparisons are reassuring. Analyses based on public opinion polls and
surveys are, on this account, consistent with the available evidence on corrupt practice: the
greater the corruption, the greater the perception of corruption.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have focused on the scope and determinants of corruption in the public
health sector in Bolivia. We define corruption broadly, to mean the use or appropriation of
public resources for private gain. The politics of transparency, accountability and corruption
have attracted a great deal of policy notoriety, but little empirical work has focused on the
institutional mechanisms that restrict or induce corrupt public practice.  In our analysis of
municipal hospitals in Bolivia we have suggested a simplified accountability-building model
to account for the potential effects of hierarchical controls (mostly administrative) and voice
mechanisms (mostly market-based) over hospital level corruption. How significant is health
sector corruption in Bolivia, and what factors account for corrupt public practice?
In a survey of clients, doctors and nurses in thirty municipal hospitals, we find that
perceptions on health sector corruption fare well compared to other public and private
sector institutions. Most respondents believe public hospitals are among the least corrupt
institutions, together with public schools and the Catholic Church. When asked to assess the
frequency of corrupt acts in the public sector, most respondents identify red-tape and public
works related corruption as being most frequent. Within the health sector itself, doctors and
nurses point to theft of medical supplies, patient misdirection and payments over operation
scheduling as being the most prominent. Finally, most respondents believe corruption in the
health sector has decreased over the past five years. Doctors are most critical of health sector29
corruption, while patients are less critical. This descriptive assessment leads to an analysis of
the determinants of corruption within the public health sector.
First, we considered the scope and determinants of informal payments to service
providers. Despite the relatively optimistic picture suggested by public perceptions, we find
that approximately 40% of clients made illegal informal payments to service providers and
administrators under the Seguro Materno Infantil.  Controlling for municipal poverty levels and
patient waiting hours, we find four variables to be significant in explaining payment
variations under alternative specifications: the degree of activism of the local citizen health
board (-), the existence of alternative private sector health providers (-), administrative
supervision of health staff (-) and competitive hiring practices (-). We hypothesize that voice
and exit mechanisms are important deterrents of illegal informal payments at the local level.
The literature on voice has stressed the effect that competition in service delivery can have
over institutional performance (Paul 1994, Picciotto 1997).  This study suggests that voice is
best assessed after controlling for more conventional hierarchical controls over public
accountability. Competition between public and private service providers is likely to be most
effective in increasing the price of non-compliance in cases where public providers are
dependent on user cost-recovery for service financing.
Second, we analyze the scope and determinants of input overpricing for
homogeneous and widely available medical supplies (dextrose, physiological solution, cotton
and alcohol). We find that, even for a small survey of prices in 24 municipalities,
standardized prices for medical supplies vary significantly.  Controlling for municipal poverty
levels, we find three significant determinants of price variation for a single input:
administrator education (+) job tenure length (-) and health board activism (-). To a lesser
extent (at 10% significance), the existence of a personnel supervision system also deters
overpricing (-).  We find that voice plays a key role in deterring overpricing, and accounts for
a 40% differential between official and purchased prices. More tentatively, the evidence also
suggests that administrative factors that promote competitive and supervised hiring and
management practices are more likely to reduce overpricing, than those relying on political
placement and discretionary practice.
Third, we contrast hard and soft measures of corruption at the municipal level. We
find that public perceptions of corruption are positively correlated to higher incidences of
informal payments and input overpricing. Greater the corruption, greater the perception of30
corruption. High actual and perceived levels of corruption tend to concentrate in larger
municipalities. Smaller, particularly rural municipalities, show low levels of both. We find
that the correlation for services in which users are directly involved is higher than when
discretionary actions go unobserved. As suggested earlier, the use of citizen voice is likely to
be correlated with public perceptions of wrongdoing. The greater the perception of
corruption, the more likely citizens will make use of voice mechanisms and monitor public
service delivery.
What are the implications of these findings for transparency, accountability and
corruption in the public health sector? From an analytical perspective, we argue that the
measurement of corrupt public practice should be institution-sensitive to account for the
particularities of different types of corrupt behavior. In the Bolivian case, we seek to capture
the decentralized and participatory characteristics of the health delivery system through a
model that controls for hierarchical controls and voice and exit variables. We observe that
the very definition of corruption comes into question when we compare perceptions from
different groups and for different types of practices. It is likely, although untested through
available data, that the public’s threshold for petty corruption is relatively high in Bolivia.
While nearly 40% of surveyed patients acknowledged having made an (illegal) informal
payment of one kind or another, over two thirds of patients, nurses and doctors rate health
sector corruption as being less or equally corrupt as other public and private sector
institutions. Only 18% percent of patients, 18% of doctors and 26% of nurses considered
hospital corruption to be widespread (with corrupt acts being carried “a lot” or “all” of the
time).
From a public policy perspective, our study has focused on the particular question of
citizen voice and public accountability. When does voice matter as a deterrent to public
sector corruption? We find that voice matters both for exposing bribery (that directly
involves citizen contact) and for deterring input overpricing (characterized by hidden action
within the health bureaucracy). In both cases, “voice” has involved citizen health board
activism, as proxied by participation in annual participatory planning, budgeting and
oversight.  In the case of bribery, the “exit” option, as proxied by the existence of private
health service providers, is also significantly correlated to corruption deterrence. What role is
left for hierarchical controls, expected to deter (ex ante) and sanction (ex post) corrupt
behavior? Unlike voice, we find no consistent evidence to suggest hierarchical controls deter31
corruption. In the case of bribery only one hierarchical variable is significant (competitive
hiring practices, at 5%); in the case of overpricing, practically none are (personnel
supervision, at 10%). The evidence on hierarchical controls is inconclusive and compounded
by the observation that both models explain only a small proportion of variation in our key
dependent variables. Perhaps the low fit also suggests omitted political and administrative
factors (at the prefectural or national level) could account for the overall impact of
hierarchical controls in corruption deterrence. Clearly, citizen involvement in public services
is likely to have a number of additional effects besides deterring corruption – including
promoting a sense of ownership, inclusion and, in some cases, political empowerment. The
links between citizen voice, transparency and increased accountability, however, stand at the
heart of present efforts to promote good governance and increase public service
performance. A significant finding of this study is that voice is indeed a significant deterrent
of corrupt behavior.32
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ANNEX A1
Summary Statistics for Determinants of Informal Payments
. summarize Payment Poverty Heard Waiting Supervis Hiring Voice
Variable |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
---------+-----------------------------------------------------
 Payment |     301    30.07143   71.23552          0        635
 Poverty |     301    71.61163   19.29069       42.5         99
   Heard |     301    3.611296   14.30496          1         90
 Waiting |     301    1.541528   .6800267          1          4
Supervis |     301    .6943522   .4614484          0          1
  Hiring |     301    .3920266   .4890156          0          1
   Voice |     281    .2775801    .448604          0          1
    Exit |     301    .4019934   .4911171          0          1
. corr Payment Poverty Heard Waiting Supervis Hiring Voice
         |   Payment  Poverty   Heard Waiting  Supervis  Hiring   Voice
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------
 Payment |   1.0000
 Poverty |  -0.1467   1.0000
   Heard |  -0.0193   0.0729   1.0000
 Waiting |   0.2791  -0.1347   0.0156   1.0000
Supervis |  -0.1732  -0.6102   0.0706   0.1820   1.0000
  Hiring |  -0.0367  -0.2514  -0.1386  - 0.1000   0.0836   1.0000
   Voice |  -0.0363  -0.1604  -0.0148  -0.2625   0.2631   0.2944   1.0000
    Exit |  -0.0758  -0.7693  -0.0233   0.0567   0.2698   0.1698   0.070835
ANNEX A2
Summary Statistics for Determinants of Input Overpricing
. sum PriceRat Tenure Educat Poverty Oversig Voice DisCent Supervis
Variable |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max
---------+-----------------------------------------------------
PriceRat |      24    1.309385   .4565702       .394       2.83
  Tenure |      24    8.827586   23.20109          0         12
  Educat |      24    6.448276   16.48719          0         5
 Poverty |      24        73.8   19.15119       42.5         99
 Oversig |      24    .4285714   .5039526          0          1
   Voice |      24    .2962963   .4653216          0          1
 DisCent |      24          .5   .5091751          0          1
Supervis |      24    .6785714   .4755949          0          1
. corr PriceRat Tenure Educat Poverty Oversig Voice DisCent Supervis
        |   PriceRat  Tenure    Educat  Poverty   Oversig  Voice  DisCent
--------+---------------------------------------------------------------
PriceRat|   1.0000
  Tenure|  -0.2389   1.0000
 Educat |   0.1248   0.6862   1.0000
 Poverty|   0.1662  -0.0934   0.2226   1.0000
Oversig |  -0.0705   0.0199  -0.2001  -0.2118   1.0000
   Voice|  -0.3377  -0.1659  -0.1478  -0.1917   0.3446   1.0000
DisCent |  -0.0460   0.0463  -0.1631  -0.6110   0.1883  -0.0144   1.0000
Supervis|  -0.3699  -0.0674  -0.2749  -0.5303   0.3290   0.2821   0.4969